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1 Introduction
The state of a (logical) object is generally not specified and
is intuitively regarded as sufficiently obvious. Often, the state
is conceived in connection with the input history of the object.
The state of an entity, let us say the determination of its
state alphabet, identification of the object is fatally depend-
ent. Moreover, if the identification of an entity follows one
and the same objective even several different final automaton
models of the object, which satisfy the given objective, can
be constructed [1].
The observer who identifies the object may be satisfied
with the recurrent definition of the state presented in this
article and, as we hope, could be persuaded that a stimulus
affecting the object only initiates (provokes) the transition
between the states of the object whereas it is the initial state of
the transition which effectuates the transition.
It is to be believed that (the physical untenability of) the so
called determinization of a nondeterministic final automaton
model will be shown to be physically untenable as it initially
respects the randomness, which it later formally ignores.
2 State of a logical object
A logical object receives and sends quantum signals. Let-
ters from the input X and output Y alphabets denote individ-
ual input and output quanta, respectively. By analogy, the
quanta of the anticipated inner signals (states) in the object
are denoted by letters of the state alphabet S.
The sampling of the input signals (stimuli) is random, and
is determined by the neighbourhood of the object. The sam-
pling of state and output signals (responses or reactions) in an
asynchronous object is derived state from the sampling of
output signals. In a synchronous object the sampling is done
indirectly in a tenacious way so that the subject has delegated
the sampling to the generator of the synchronizing pulses. If
the object synchronises itself by means of a synchroniser, the
situation can be denoted as an autosynchronous object, or the
object of state sampling and the respective responses ‘forces’
the neighbourhood to accept a speed independent object.
Let T be a set of sampling moments and the binary rela-
tion : : ,T t t2  be a relationship of a strong arrangement on
T, t t , meaning that moment t was initiated before moment
t . The monomorphism from T, to N, is said to hold if
there exists a simple function f T t v: : N  such that
t t f t f t    ( ) ( ),
where N is a set of integers including zero. If f t v( )  and
f t v( )   1, moment t is said to have initiated immediately
before moment t . In addition, let there be AN, esp. A() or A,
where A is one of the alphabets and  is the time moment
 	N), set {N  A}, esp.{{ }  A}, or {  A}of all
representations N A a a a ai i : , , ( )0 10 1
0 1
    , spec.
{ } : ( )   A a ai , or   A a ei: ( )and .
Let us therefore, denote

 
AN , esp .

 
A{ } , either AN
or A ({e}), esp. either A{}, or A ({e}) and also

 
a a0 1 ,
esp.

 
a  , either a0 a1 … or e, esp. either a or e.
The performance of a deterministic logical object with a
given input X, state S, and output Y alphabets can be modeled
by a system of functions consisting of the
 transition function
      : : ,{ } { } { }S X S s x s   1 1
 output function
 
 
      : : ,{ } { } { }S X Y s x y   1
i.e. either s x y  ,  1 or s y  of the Mealy, or Moore,
type respectively, where  is the current moment of sampling
and x, s, y are the respective current stimulus, state, re-
sponse; moment 1 is the immediate follower of moment 
and s1 is the follower state of state s . However, since the
future state s1, is not yet at our disposal (!), the value of
the transition function is given by the current predication of
state
s pred s   1 1– ( ), i.e.
 
   
    : : , ( )
{ }
S X S s x pred s   1 1 .
Being aware of the fact above, we will keep to the tradi-
tional notation of function . Note also that the transition
function offers, in fact, two possibilities causing the transition
from state s to that of s1: the starting state of transition s
and stimulus x; it remains only to decide which cause is the
dominant one.
Since the postdiction post (s1) of predecessor states s1
to the current state is not generally unambiguous, i.e., for
   
     s x s x si j
   
 
1 1 1 1, ,
we can admit s s i ji j
  
 
1 1( ) we will introduce a general-
ized transition  function
        	  : : ,{ } { , , , } { }S X S s x x x s   1 1 1  
recurrently so that
    	 	   	( ( , ), )s x x x x s   .
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It can be intuitively stated that the state of an object is
defined by the entire input cumulated prehistory H of the ob-
ject. The response y is a value of the output function:
      : : ,{ } { } { }[ ] [ ]H X Y h x y  
of an output block O of the object, where h is the instanta-
neous input prehistory. Therefore, we expect the given object
to be divided into two components: the fixator F of the input
prehistory h and the output block O (Fig. 1).
Fixator F records and issues the input prehistory; since,
however, F does not delete (!) every recorded prehistory H,
the prehistory is kept in a cumulated form (let us imagine,
e.g., the whole Bible recorded on one current page of paper).
A performance model of fixator F is a transition function
      : : ,{ } { } { }H X H h x h   1 1 .
First let there be H X N and
H x x x x x x X N 	 0 1 1 0 1 1  ( )
[2] and consider an initially finite automaton model of the
fixator [3]
F  X X eN, , ,1
where 1 is the transition function
   
 
1
0 1 1
0 1 1
: : [ ],
[ ]
[ ] { }X X X x x x x
x x x x
N N
 


 
 
and N is a set of integer numbers including zero. For the tran-
sition function 1 there holds (i j ):
 x x x x x x x x x x x x xi i i j j j i i i j j j
0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1
   
     
  
 1x
 x x x x x x x x x x x x xi i i j j j i i i j j j
0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1
   
     
  
 1x
 (Fig. 2a) and not
x x x x x x x x x x x x xi i i j j j i i i j j j
0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1
   
     
  
 1x ,
(whereŢis the statement of an implication) which can also
be rightly required (Fig. 2b),
 it can be legitimately required that
   ( )x x x x x x x0 1 1 0 1 1   , esp.  ( , )e x e , this is, how-
ever, contradictory (Fig. 3).
Let us write more cunningly H X N ( / ) and
h x x x x x x X N 	 { } ({ } ( / )0 1 0 1   [3, 4, 5],
where ( / )X N  is the finite partition on XN defined on XN
through the Nerode equivalence the class of partition ( / )X N 
is denoted and we can consider the fixator model
F  X X eN, ( / ), , { }2 ,
where 2 is the transition function
 
  
2
0 1 1 0 1 1
: ( / ) ( / ) :
,
{ }
[{ }] {[
X X X
x x x x x x x
N N
   
 
   ] }x .
We have still to define the right-side congruence
Nerode equivalence  on XN; the input words x x xi i i
0 1

 and
x x xj j j
0 1

 (i j ) are said to be right-side congruent, if there
holds
   2
0 1
2
0 1( ) ( ){ }, { },e x x x e x x xi i i j j j 
     2
0 1 1 2( ){ },e x x x x x xi i i   

     2
0 1 1 2( ){ },e x x x x x xj j j 
For the transition function 2 there is (i j ):
 { } { }x x x x x xi i i j j j
0 1 1 0 1 1
 
  
 
 
 { } { }x x x x x x x xi i i j j j
0 1 1 0 1 1
 
   
 { } { }x x x x x xi i i j j j
0 1 1 0 1 1
 
  
 



 { } { }x x x x x x x xi i i j j j
0 1 1 0 1 1
 
   
where 

means either = or  ,
 { , } { }a x e  is legitimate.
If we write both S X N , s0  e, s x0 x1… x1 and
s x x x x   1 0 1 1 and then S X N ( / ) ,
s0  {e}, s {x0 x1… x1} and s x x x x   1 0 1 1{ } , then,
obviously, the first conception is equivalent to the transition:
 s s s x s xi j i j
        1 1( , ) ( , ),
but this is not so with the transitions:
 s s s x s xi j i j
        1 1( , ) ( , )
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Fig. 1: Division of the object into fixator F and output block O
a)
b)
Fig. 2: Pairs of legitimized transitions of fixator F: a) correct, b)
contradictory
Fig. 3: Justified, but contradictory transitions of fixator F
    1( , )s x s , esp. 1
0 0 0( , )s x s ,
whereas, even under the condition that the second concep-
tion will cope with the transitions:
 s s s x s xi j i j
        2 2( , ) ( , )
 s s s x s xi j i j
        2 2( , ) ( , )
    2( , )s x s , esp. 2
0 0 0( , )s x s ,
it is still closely connected with the problematic acceptance
of the empty word e by the object.
Example 1: Let the input alphabet {a, b, c} be given, and let
at:
1) S e c bc c bc b c bc ba c bc a    { ,( ) ,( ) ,( ) ,( ) }* * * * , where *,
 are respective iterations, disjunctions and concatenation
of the Kleene algebra of regular expressions, a transition
function 1 being defined as:
 1( , )e e e , 1( ,( ) ) ( )
* *e c bc c bc   ,
 1( ,( ) ) ( )
* *e c bc b c bc b   ,
 1( ,( ) ) ( )
* *e c bc ba c bc ba   ,
1( ,( ) ) ( )
* *e c bc a c bc a   .
If we make an unwilling and unreal compromise that
1   e c bc( )*, 2  ( )*c bc b and 3    ( ) ( )* *c bc ba c bc a,
we obtain the transition diagram from Fig. 4.
2) S e c bc c bc b c bc ba c bc a     { }{ ,( ) },{( ) },{( ) ,( ) }* * * *
 { , , }1 2 3 , where 1  { ,( ) }*e c bc , 2  {( ) }*c bc b and
3   {( ) ( ) }* *c bc a bc , the transition function 2 being
defined:
  2 21 1 1( , ) ( , ( ) )
*e c bc   ,
 2 1 2( , ( ) )
*c bc b  ,
  2 21 1 3( , ( ) ) ( , ( ) )
* *c bc a c bc ba    ,
we obtain Fig. 4.
Not defining the state as a cumulated input history or
as a block of the final decomposition (Nerode), we can now
recurrently define the state of a logical object:
 the initial state s0, i.e.,  ( ,|)s s0 0 , where | is a separator, is
a state,
 s
1 is a state if there holds  
( , , , , )s x x x0 0 1 1  .
Let us consider the transition function    ( , )s x s 1 and
ask whether according to the transition function the cause of
the transition from initiating state s to follower state s1 can
be assumed. A general opinion is that the cause of the state
transition is merely the stimulus x [6]. By analogy, the only
cause of the state transition can be assumed to be its initial
state s. Both strict conceptions do not seem to be very
convincing, since the cause of transition of an object to the
follower state s1 can be regarded both as the state s, and the
stimulus x. Let us traditionally characterize the causes s or x
as necessary or sufficient, respectively. (Let us admit that a
sufficient cause always initiates the transition of an object to
s1, but need not always result in attaining the object s1; if
the object has attained state s1, then it was certainly due to
the necessary cause.) Since both      ( , ) ( , )s x s x si j 
1
and      ( , ) ( , )s x s x si j 
1 can be admitted for s si j
 
 or
x xi j
 
 , respectively, a decision cannot be made which of the
causes, s or x, is necessary and which is sufficient. Thus, let
us characterize causes s and x as executing and initiating
causes and decide which of them is the executing cause, and
which is the initiating cause. Let us, therefore, assume the fol-
lowing logical objects:
a) a frog sitting on a water lily leaf in a pond,
b) loose material in a discharging hopper and a truck,
c) a logical object.
ad a) A frog sitting on a water lily leaf – initial transition state
(s) – spots an insect – stimulus x – jumps on to another leaf to
catch the insect – follower state (s1). The stimulus is obvi-
ously a mere initiator of the jump, whereas the initiating state
is its executor of the jump.
ad b) Opening the discharging valve – stimulus x – produces
the pouring of sand from the hopper – initiating transition
state s – into the truck – follower state (s 1). Again, the stim-
ulus only initiates the pouring of sand, whereas the sand in
the discharging hopper is the executor of the pouring.
ad c) Since dynamic logical objects are designed through ca-
nonical decomposition and since a substitute of the given
object is usually a parallel register of flip flop circuits or unit
delay circuits, and since each flip flop circuit is again designed
through canonical decomposition (without respect to the in-
tuitively designed RS-flip flop circuit), and since the substitute
of the selected flip flop circuit in canonical decomposition is
a unit delay circuit, let us examine its action. The unit delay
circuit is the only dynamic element, since its finite – automa-
ton model is an ordered trio
, ,Q D
where , Q is the respective input state alphabet and  is the
transition function       D Q D pred q: ( ) : ( )
{ } { } { }
  
 1 1
proving the indivisibility of the unit delay circuit. Across the
pulse front, or the fall time of stimulus D, when identifying
the imperceptible intermediate state with the initial state
of transition q (otherwise a delay cannot be mentioned),
the delay circuit, after the given time has elapsed, passes
from initial state q to follower state q1 immediately and
spontaneously.
Spontaneous realization of delay circuit state transitions
after some time has elapsed from the instant of acceptance of
the change of stimulus D by the delay circuit is, however, a
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Fig. 4: Transition diagram of the automaton from Example 1
fiction. In which way, then, should the realization of the state
transition from q to q1 through an uninvited change of
stimulus D be explained; We have to the transition from q to
q1 of the respective delay circuits was usually effected by the
initial state of the transition q. Let us then follow the succes-
sive action, without loss of generality, of a binary symmetrical
delay circuit with the delay  according to Fig. 5 a), b).
It is necessary to explain what happens to the object dur-
ing the transition from state s to state s1. Without any doubt
the object is in some uninteresting, imperceptible intermedi-
ate state, which is not taken into account by the model. Since
an object is determined by its model there is no other way
than to identify the intermediate state either with initiating
state s or with follower state s1 of the transition; the inter-
mediate state is, in fact, made respected by the model. Since
the above mentioned identification appears not to be effected
it is sometimes stated that the Mealy automaton produces a
response y during the transition    ( , )s x s 1. If the inter-
mediate state of the state transition is identified either with
the initiating state or with the state of the end transition, the
state transition of the finite – automaton model is instanta-
neous. In this way, space of a state transition in a logical object
itself can be taken into account.
Let us mention the acceptance of an empty word e by an
object. Since the empty word e (as an empty set ) is an empty
concept, i.e., a concept with a controversial content and an
empty extent (an empty word does not contain any word of
length 1, whereas a word is determined by the sequence of its
words of length 1) the acceptance of e by a logical object can
be only virtual. We say that an object with the same initial and
end state s0 accepts an empty word e s e s  ( , )0 0 – (Fig. 6);
if the reader does not agree with the above statement, we will
introduce an unempty word x on the object, which will be
transferred by the object to a stable, for x retaining state
z s x z   ( , )0 ,    ( , )z x z , and we will state that prior
to the introduction of the word x the object accepted empty
word e. Thus, the transitions   ( , )s e s are imaginary since
the acceptance of e by the object is virtual. Only    ( ,| )s s
is offered, which is a virtual state transition initiated by sepa-
rating word |, where | is the separator (usually a space) and is
a letter, though unpublished, of the input alphabet X.
3 ‘Determinization’ of a
nondeterministic automaton
Let, without generality loss, a final-automaton model of a
nondetermistic logical object be a semiautomaton A
A S X, , 
where  is the transition relation
      : : , ,{ } { } { }S X S s x s   1 1
and s1 is one of the possible states of the followers of initial
transition state s, i.e.,
s S  	1 1,
 
S proj s x s
s
   

 


1
3
1
1, , .
The transition from state s to just one of the possi-
ble states of the followers from S1 along with stimulus x
initiated by an implicit (inaccessible for the observer – immea-
surable) random fault; the fault is not meant only as a failure
of the object but also as an action effect of the neighborhood
or of the object itself.
The so called determinization of a nondeterministic
automaton transforms a nondeterministic automaton to a
deterministic one [7]. To all possible followers of each initial
state of the transition of the given nondeterministic automaton
we will find all of their possible followers, and then, purely in a
speculative way, we will specify them as the initial states of
transitions and also find of their possible followers, etc., as
long as the procedure renders the sets of possible follower
states that have not occurred so far. Then we will substitute
each set of possible states S, formed in this way, by the only
certain state of the ‘determinizated’ nondeterministic autom-
aton so that the mutually different sets are assigned different
states. Hence the transition function d of the ‘determin-
izated’ nondeterministic automaton:
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q
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1
11
0 0
0
Fig. 5: a) Graphical symbol, b) action, c) delay circuit transition
table
s
0
z

x

x

Fig. 6: Virtual acceptance of an empty word

    
d
S SX S x S: : ,
{ } { }{ }2 2
1 1
 



where 2S is the potency of the state alphabet S.
Example 2: Construct a deterministic automaton (Table 1 b))
to a given nondeterministic automaton (Table 1 a)). After a
state assignment (two left columns in Table 1 b)) we obtain
a transition table of the ‘determinizated’ nondeterministic
automaton (Table 1 c)).
Note a formal peculiarity of determinization: the states of
an immediately constructed deterministic automaton are sets
of states of the given nondeterministic automaton. It is aston-
ishing how the mere replacement of the sets of possible fol-
lower states by a certain follower eliminates a random an ac-
tion of implicit (immeasurable) faults. This peculiarity can be
explained by stating that either the possible followers or the
substituting certain follower are not simply states, otherwise
the nondeterminism of an object is a fiction.
If we were succeeded in identifying the faults, only one
physically acceptable adequate nondeterministic automaton
with a so called fault input could be constructed to the given
nondeterministic automaton. Thus, if Z is a fault alphabet
(the alphabet of explicit measurable faults), then for the tran-
sition function e of a semiautomaton
X Z S e , , 
with a fault input, there holds
        	e S X Z S s x z s: : , ,
{ } { } { } { }
  
1

Example 3: Assume that a fault alphabet {z1, z2, z3} of the au-
tomaton from Example 2 is given such that, e.g., the Table 2
holds.
4 Conclusions
As a satisfactory definition of the state of a logical ob-
ject and its recurrent introduction can thus be regarded,
the adequacy of which is proved particularly in identifica-
tion of logical objects on the state distinguishing level. The
‘determinization’ of a nondeterministic finite automaton is
undoubtedly a myth.
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